Recent research has made the surprising finding that state-of-the-art deep learning models sometimes fail to generalize to small variations of the input. Adversarial training has been shown to be an effective approach to overcome this problem. However, its application has been limited to enforcing invariance to analytically defined transformations like p -norm bounded perturbations. Such perturbations do not necessarily cover plausible real-world variations that preserve the semantics of the input (such as a change in lighting conditions). In this paper, we propose a novel approach to express and formalize robustness to these kinds of real-world transformations of the input. The two key ideas underlying our formulation are (1) leveraging disentangled representations of the input to define different factors of variations, and (2) generating new input images by adversarially composing the representations of different images. We use a StyleGAN model to demonstrate the efficacy of this framework. Specifically, we leverage the disentangled latent representations computed by a StyleGAN model to generate perturbations of an image that are similar to real-world variations (like adding make-up, or changing the skin-tone of a person) and train models to be invariant to these perturbations. Extensive experiments show that our method improves generalization and reduces the effect of spurious correlations. 1
Introduction
The principle by which neural networks are trained to minimize their average error on the training data is known as Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) [1] . ERM has, for the most part, enabled breakthroughs in a wide variety of fields [2] [3] [4] , and this success has lead to the usage of neural Figure 1 . Two variations of the same face that are classified as both "smiling" and "not smiling" with close to 100% confidence by the same classifier. Note that this person "does not exist" and has been generated using a StyleGAN model. networks in applications that are safety-critical [5] . ERM, however, is only guaranteed to produce meaningful models when the data encountered during training and deployment is drawn independently from the same distribution. When a mismatch between training and testing data occurs, models can fail in catastrophic ways; and, unfortunately, such occurrence is commonplace: training data is often collected through a biased process that highlights confounding factors and spurious correlations [6, 7] , which can lead to undesirable consequences. 1 The effects of such data shifts are largely detailed in the literature. For example, both Recht et al. [8] and Hendrycks et al. [9] show that the accuracy of IMAGENET models is severely impacted by changes in the data collection process. Methods to counteract such effect, which mainly consist of data augmentation techniques, also struggle. Training against corrupted data only forces the memorization of such corruptions and, as a result, these models fail to generalize to new corruptions [10, 11] . Works such as mixup [12] or AutoAugment [13] pave the way to further improvements, but still require significant domain knowledge to succeed in practice.
Another parallel and important line of work uncovered that the addition of small but carefully chosen deviations to the input, called adversarial perturbations, can cause the neural network to make incorrect predictions with high confidence [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . Techniques to build models that are robust to adversarially perturbed examples, such as adversarial training [19] , have received a significant amount of attention in the recent years [16, [20] [21] [22] . The existence of imperceptible perturbations that alter a model's output demonstrates that supervised learning algorithms still fail to capture the true causal relationships between signal and label. The degradation of performance occurred when shifting between training and adversarial (or otherwise corrupted) distributions indicates that neural networks pick up on correlations that are not necessarily robust to small input perturbations [23] . The existence of imperceptible adversarial perturbations highlights just one form of spurious correlation that causes undesirable behaviors in the networks we train.
This paper focuses on training models that are robust to plausible real-world perturbations that preserve semantic content (such as those presented in Figure 1 ). We go beyond conventional data augmentation and adversarial training on l p -norm bounded perturbations by leveraging high-quality generative models that can describe such perturbations. In particular, we address the question: "Given a generative model with a sufficiently good disentangled representation that aligns well with the perturbations of interest, can we train neural networks that are resistant to bias and spurious correlations present in the training data?" More specifically, we consider StyleGAN [24] as our underlying generative model. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We develop a framework dubbed Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Representations (AdvMix) which leverages the disentangled latents of a generative model to train networks that are robust to real-world variations.
2. We demonstrate how to leverage StyleGAN's mixing property to systematically transfer image attributes likely to be misclassified across image instances, thus allowing us to generate realistic worst-case semantic variations. This enables us to define semantic perturbations in a purely data-driven fashion, as opposed to methods that require data collection under different conditions [25] .
We conduct extensive experiments on a controlled
Colored-MNIST dataset that compare Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Representations with random data augmentation and demonstrate under which conditions AdvMix achieves higher accuracy.
4. Finally, we demonstrate empirically on CELEBA that accuracy is not necessarily at odds with robustness [26] , once we consider semantic variations other than pnorm bounded variations.
Related work
Robustness to p -norm perturbations. Generating pixellevel adversarial perturbations has been and remains extensively studied [16, 18-20, 27, 28] . Most works focus the robustness of classifiers under p -norm bounded perturbations. In particular, it is expected that a robust classifier be invariant to small perturbations in the pixel space (as defined by the p -norm). Goodfellow et al. [16] and Madry et al. [19] laid down foundational principles to train robust networks, and recent works [29, 30] continue to find novel approaches to enhance robustness. While existing work is able to train models that are robust to imperceptible pixellevel variations, the study of robustness against semantically meaningful perturbations is largely under-explored.
Adversarial robustness beyond p -norm. Engstrom et al. [31] and Kanbak et al. [32] explored geometric transformations such as rotations and translation of images. Early works (e.g., Baluja and Fischer [33] ) also demonstrated that it is possible to go beyond analytically defined variations by using generative models to create perturbations. Song et al. [34] and Xiao et al. [35] used a pre-trained AC-GAN [36] to generate perturbations; and they demonstrated that it is possible to generate semantically relevant perturbations for tasks such as MNIST, SVHN and CELEBA. Lastly, Qiu et al. [37] have attempted to generate adversarial examples by interpolating through the attribute space defined by a generative model. So far, there has been little to no work demonstrating robustness to such semantically plausible variations. As such the effect of training models robust to such variations is unclear. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the difference between adversarial training and data augmentation in the space of semantically meaningful variations.
Data augmentation Data augmentation can reduce generalization error. For image classification tasks, random flips, rotations and crops are commonly used [38] . More sophisticated techniques such as Cutout [39] (which produces random occlusions), CutMix [40] (which replaces parts of an image with another) and mixup [12] (which linearly interpolates between two images) all demonstrate extremely compelling and surprising results. Indeed, while these methods often result in images that are visibly corrupted and void of semantic meaning (even to the human eye), the resulting models often achieve state-of-the-art accuracy across a wide range of datasets. Figure 2 shows a comparison of these different techniques.
Causal reasoning using additional data. Heinze-Deml and Meinshausen [41] use grouped observations (e.g., the same object under different conditions) to discover variations that should not explain the classification label. More recently Arjovsky et al. [25] developed a method called Invariant Risk Minimization (IRM) which tries to find an invariant predictor across different environments (or groups of data points). Both methods were able to build classifiers that were less sensitive to spurious correlations, which, in turn, lead to classifiers that were less biased than classifiers trained purely on an original biased training set. However, they require explicitly annotated data collected under different environmental conditions.
Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Representations
In this paper, we consider a model f θ parametrized by θ. We would like our model to be robust or invariant to a set of transformations T . Formally, our goal is to find the model parameters θ that minimize the semantic adversarial risk
where D ⊂ X × Y is a data distribution over pairs of examples x and corresponding labels y, and L is a suitable loss function (such as the 0 − 1 loss in the context of classification tasks). The set of semantic transformations T contains functions of the form t : X → X . Each element t ∈ T is irreducible and, crucially, for the optimal classifier f θ : X → Y, we would like that f θ (t(x)) = f θ (x) for all t ∈ T . For example, an MNIST classifier should not be affected by changes in the digit color. In the following, we define a set of transformations T via a decoder that leverages a disentangled latent representation and explain how to evaluate the resulting risk in Equation (1).
Invariant latent factors.
Disentanglement is perceived as a desirable property of representations. Often, one hopes to obtain a representation of the observed data x ∈ X in terms of separate and conditionally independent factors z ∈ Z given x under a certain class of input transformations [42] . In our particular setting, we will assume a task-specific disentangled representation. Formally, we assume that we have an ideal generator (or decoder), dec : Z → X , where the latent space Z is a product space of the form Z = Z ×Z ⊥ . For a given classification task that predicts the label y, only the coordinates corresponding to Z are relevant, while Z ⊥ is irrelevant. We formalize the above notions using conditional independence: given an example
Hence, the ideal invariant classifier f that outputs a probability distribution over Y should be consistent with the invariance assumption:
for allz ⊥ ∈ Z ⊥ , and should output the correct label:
Finally, referring back to Equation (1) and assuming that an ideal disentangled representation z can be computed as z (x), we define the set of transforms T that induce the semantically irrelevant perturbations as:
Adversarial training. Given a model f θ with enough capacity, minimizing the semantic adversarial risk in Equation (1) results in parameters θ
that satisfy Equations (3) and (4). In other words, there exists no transformation t ∈ T that when applied to x would result in a misclassification of the optimal classifier f = f θ . Solving the saddle point problem in Equation (6) requires solving the corresponding inner-maximization problem
As enumerating all possible latentsz ⊥ ∈ Z ⊥ is often intractable, we resort to a technique popularized by Madry et al. [19] in the context of adversarial training, which consists of using projected gradient ascent on a differentiable surrogate loss. For a classification task, the 0 − 1 loss is replaced with the cross-entropy loss: Figure 3 . Illustration of the maximization process in Equation (9). where [a] i returns the i-th coordinate of a, and gradient ascent steps are then interleaved with projection steps for a given number of iterations K. Formally, we find an estimatẽ z (K) ⊥ ofz ⊥ using the following recursion:
wherez (0)
⊥ is chosen at random within Z ⊥ , α is a constant step-size and proj A (a) is a projection operator that project a onto A. Figure 3 illustrates the process.
Ultimately, Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Representations (shortened as AdvMix) tries to find parameters that minimize the worst-case loss that could arise from altering the input examples through plausible transformations. It guarantees that transformations of the input are meaningful by using a disentangled latent representation that encodes independent controllable factors, where some of these factors are known to be independent from the label. Finding such a disentangled representation is rarely possible, as it is not always known which variations of the input should or should not affect the label. In some cases, however, it is possible to train generative models such that we expect some subset of the latents to not affect the label. Section 4 implements AdvMix using a StyleGAN model.
Data with low density regions. The motivation behind
AdvMix stems from the manifold hypothesis [43] . It states that high dimensional data present in the real-world, such as images, often lies on a low-dimensional manifold. As a consequence, there exists large regions in the input space that are outside the support of the data distribution. Hence, for maximal efficiency, data augmentation and adversarial training should be done carefully to make sure that the augmented data is still within the support of the original data distribution. Data augmentation techniques presented in Figure 2 clearly violate this condition, and despite their success, we cannot expect that they perform well across all datasets (in fact, mixup performs poorly on Colored-MNIST). Similarly, adversarial training targeting p -norm bounded perturbations tend to trade-off accuracy for robustness [23] . Figure 4 compares mixup and AdvMix on a toy example. In this example, we artificially construct a dataset with two classes and an underlying disentangled latent representation. We observe that by exploiting the knowledge of the disentangled latent representation, AdvMix is capable of generating additional datapoints that are consistent with the original dataset, while mixup generates additional datapoints that are unlikely.
Relationship to mixup. mixup augments data with respect to the input space. Given two pairs of inputs (x A , y A ), (x B , y B ) and a linear interpolation factor sampled from a β-distribution λ ∼ β(α, α), mixup generate a new input pair as follows:x
Our methodology combines inputs (
Crucially, this combination only affects the latent sub-space that is independent from the label, thus the label remains unchanged. We also note that no interpolation occurs in the latent space (i.e., λz A⊥ + (1 − λ)z B ⊥ ) as this could result in points that are outside Z ⊥ when Z ⊥ is not convex.
Relationship to Invariant Risk Minimization. Arjovsky et al. [25] consider the case where we have multiple datasets D e = {x i , y i } n i=1 drawn from different training environments e ∈ E. As explained in [25] , the motivation behind IRM is to minimize the worst-case risk
In this paper, the environments are defined by the different instances of z ⊥ ∈ Z ⊥ . Given a dataset {dec(z i , z i⊥ ), y i } n i=1 , we can rewrite the semantic adversarial risk shown in Equation (1) as Equation (12) by setting the environment set E to
This effectively create an ensemble of datasets for all possible combinations of z ⊥ ∈ Z ⊥ for all examples. The crucial difference between IRM and AdvMix is in the formulation of the risk. While IRM computes the risk by enumerating over a countable set of environments and picking the worst-case, AdvMix attempts to compute the worst-case risk by finding the combination of variations that maximize the risk over all examples.
Implementation using StyleGAN
So far, we have assumed the presence of a generator (or decoder) that is capable of using a perfectly disentangled latent representation. Furthermore, we have assumed that this representation is partitioned into two subsets, one of which is known to be independent from the target label. In practice, the methodology is often reversed: generative models are trained in the hope of obtaining some level of disentanglement. If a partition of the trained latent space does not influence the label, we can use the corresponding trained generator within AdvMix. This section explains why StyleGAN is a good candidate and details how to implement AdvMix in this context.
StyleGAN.
StyleGAN is a generator architecture for generative adversarial networks proposed by Karras et al. [24] . It borrows interesting properties from the style transfer literature [44] . In this work, we rely on the style mixing property. Formally, the StyleGAN architecture is composed of two stages. The first stage takes a latent variable z ∼ N (0, 1) that is not necessarily disentangled and projects it into a disentangled latent space z = map(z). The second stage synthesizes an image x from the disentangled latents z using a decoder x = dec(z). Overall, the process of generating an image x using a StyleGAN network is defined as
The intermediate latent variables z provide some level of disentanglement that affects image generation at different spatial resolutions which allows us to control the synthesis of an image. Particularly, we can apply the "style" of an image to another by mixing the disentangled latents of these images together. In the context of face generation, the styles corresponding to coarse spatial resolutions affect high-level aspects such as pose, and styles of fine resolutions affect mainly the color scheme. In the rest of this manuscript, we focus on variations of the finer style. 2 Concretely, we make the assumption that the coarse attributes may be label-dependent, z , while the fine attributes are label-independent, z ⊥ . Consequently, the finer style z B ⊥ of an image x B can be applied to another image
. Figure 5b shows a nominal image and two variations of that image obtained by mixing the finer style of two other images.
Definition of the transformation set. For completeness, we can now define the set of transforms T in Equation (5) by defining Z ⊥ . While the formulation of StyleGAN allows z to be sampled within an infinite support, our formulation requires Z ⊥ to be finite. As explained by Nalisnick et al. [45] , due to concentration of measure, a generative model usually draws samples from its typical set [46] (a subset of the model's full support) rather than regions of high probability density. 3 As such, if z ∈ R d , we wish 4 to define Z ⊥ as follows:
where δ is a small tunable positive constant.
Construction of a dataset of disentangled latents. In order to extract the coarse style, z , from a dataset, D = {x i , y i } n i=1 , we need to find a mapping between the image space and the latent space. This mapping, which can be computed offline, is used to construct the latent dataset {z i , y i } n i=1 , and is only required once for each new dataset. Specifically, this mapping is denoted as enc : X → Z and finds z i such that x i ≈ dec(z i ). Algorithm 1 defines this mapping through an optimization process. Inspired by [48] , and rather than relying solely on the distance between pixel values to define the loss of that optimization, we use the perceptual loss [49, 50] -which helps steer the optimization process. The perceptual loss is defined on the intermediate activations of a trained VGG-16 network [51] (see line 7) . We also found that the StyleGAN generator, dec, is a surjective mapping between its disentangled latent space and the 2 Other variations are possible as long as we have the certainty that they should not affect the label of interest. 3 For d-dimensional isotropic Gaussian with standard deviation σ, the typical set resides at a distance of σ √ d from the mode [47] . 4 In practice, for efficiency reason, we do not want to backpropagate through the map operation and we instead form the typical set by sampling a small number of disentangled latents (more details are given in Algorithm 2). 
Â is a list of activations (after the 2 nd convolution of 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd blocks) 5:
A = vgg(x) 6:
A mix = vgg(dec(ẑ , map(z) ⊥ ))) with z ∼ N (0, 1)
Reconstruction loss 8:
Mixing loss 9:ẑ ←ẑ − γ (k) ∇ẑ (Lreconstruct + L mix ) 10: end for image space (i.e., multiple latents can decode into the same image). Hence, since we heavily rely on the mixing property of StyleGAN, and to the contrary of [48] , we propose to add an additional component to the loss that steers the latents towards a subset of latents that can be mixed. In particular, we add a perceptual loss between the synthesized image and a mixed version of the same image, mixed with a randomly generated image (see lines 6 and 8). Figure 5 shows the evolution of the optimization process as well as mixed variants of the same image.
Generating worst-case examples to train robust models. As explained in Section 3, minimizing the semantic adversarial risk requires solving an inner-maximization problem for which we use projected gradient ascent. Algorithm 2 illustrates the process. It approximates the typical set in Equation (15) by randomly sampling initial latentsz ⊥ ) that is misclassified. Figure 1 shows the result of this optimization procedure where the original image is classified as "not smiling" and 5 The actual implementation used in the experimental section projects back onto a ∞-bounded neighborhood aroundz 
for k ∈ {1, . . . , K} do K is the number of optimization steps
if L(f θ (x (k) ), y) > L(f θ (x, y) then 10:x ←x (k) 11:
return Since L is the 0 − 1 loss, the procedure can terminate early 12:
end if 13: end for 14: end for the optimized image is classified as "smiling". From hereon, the training process is identical to adversarial training as proposed in [19] . For each training batch, and each example in that batch, we find a potential variation that would be misclassified and minimize the cross-entropy loss at these variations.
Random mixing with disentangled representations. While this section describes an instantiation of AdvMix using StyleGAN, it is possible to formulate an equivalent random data augmentation baseline. For an input x, we generate a random variation as follows:
Results
In this section, we compare AdvMix to (i) nominal training which minimizes the empirical risk, (ii) Adversarial Training (AT) which minimizes the adversarial risk over ∞norm bounded perturbations of size in input space [19] , and (iii) Random Mixing with Disentangled Representations (RandMix) which minimizes the vicinal risk by randomly sampling latents from Z ⊥ (rather than systematically finding the worst-case variations). We perform two experiments to assess the generalization abilities of AdvMix. The first experiment is done on an artificially constructed dataset called Colored-MNIST (it bares resemblance to the Colored-MNIST experiments present in [25] ). The second experiment uses CELEBA. Both experiment demonstrate that methods using semantic variations as expressed by a trained StyleGAN model achieve higher accuracy. It also demonstrates that, when the distribution of variations is skewed (i.e., some variations z ⊥ appear more often than others in the dataset used to train the StyleGAN model), AdvMix obtains higher accuracy than RandMix. For both experiments, we use a truncated VGG network with 5 layers. We use the Adam [52] optimizer with a learning rate of 10 −3 . AdvMix is trained with N r set to 5.
Colored-MNIST
Colored-MNIST consists of a dataset of MNIST [53] digits that are artificially colored to emphasize bias. On the training set, we color each pair (x, y) of the original MNIST dataset with a color drawn randomly from a normal distribution with mean µ y and standard deviation σ (means µ y for y ∈ {0, . . . , 9} are shown in Figure 6 ). On the test set, we randomly color digits. In other words, the colors present in the training set spuriously correlate with the label. We can use σ to affect this correlation: by progressively increasing σ the dataset becomes less biased. For all techniques (including mixup), we vary the level of bias and train models using 5 epochs. The StyleGAN model is trained on the training set only, once for each setting of σ. The disentangled latents defining the finer style correspond to the final resolution of 32 × 32. 6 Figure 7 shows the results. Across all settings, RandMix and AdvMix outperform the other methods. As expected, the gap between all methods decreases as the training set becomes less biased. It is also worth noting that AT is useful (compared to nominal training and mixup) as on this dataset ∞ -norm bounded perturbations allow the exploration of slight variations in colors. RandMix and AdvMix are both expected to do well as all variations z ⊥ (that correspond to applications of different colors) are equally likely to be drawn from the StyleGAN model (since they are uniformly distributed in the training set).
To further emphasize the difference between RandMix and AdvMix, we purposefully bias the training of the Style-GAN model. We create two additional datasets (with σ = 0). 6 32 corresponds to the next power of two after 28 which is the size of the original MNIST dataset. With the first dataset (named "more biased"), the StyleGAN model is trained on a large fraction of zeros (and few other digits), while on the second dataset (named "less biased", the StyleGAN model is trained on a large fraction of zeros and ones. As a result, rarely occurring variations (colors of digits from 1 to 9 for the first dataset and colors of digits from 2 to 9 for the second) are less likely to be randomly selected by RandMix. Table 1 shows the results. We observe that AdvMix performs better. However, we note that the gap is not large, as all color variations all contain red, green and blue components (which allows the network to implicitly learn about other color combinations).
Finally, to create a stronger effect, we limit digits to the red, green and blue colors only (resulting in new datasets), and use a linear classifier. Table 2 demonstrates that, when the StyleGAN model is trained with a significant proportion of red digits, AdvMix does much better. Indeed, AdvMix is able to systematically find the corner cases (i.e., green and blue variations) that are currently misclassified rather than relying on the random sampling of such cases. We note that adversarial training can result in unstable learning, which can explain why RandMix does slightly better when the StyleGAN model is unbiased. 
CELEBA
CELEBA [54] is a large-scale public dataset with forty different face attribute annotations including whether a person smiles or wears a hat. We make no modifications to the dataset and use a pretrained StyleGAN model 7 . For all techniques, we train models using 20 epochs. We evaluate all methods on their ability to classify the "smiling" attribute, as well as three other attributes. 8 In this experiment, the disentangled latents defining the finer style correspond to resolutions ranging from 128 × 128 to 1024 × 1024. 9 In addition, to the evaluation of the unmodified clean test set, we also evaluate all methods by executing Algorithm 2 with N r set to 10. In other words, for each trained classifier, we try to find a misclassified variant for each example of the test set. When a misclassified variant is found, we count the corresponding example as misclassified "under perturbation".
We observe that AdvMix is the only method that systematically achieves high accuracy on clean and perturbed images. It is also interesting to see that RandMix does not always improve on nominal training and that AT consistently trades off clean accuracy for ∞ -robustness (as seen in [23] ). Finally, Figure 8 shows qualitative examples of images that are all correctly classified by the nominal model, but for which we can find plausible variants that are misclassified. 
Conclusion
We have demonstrated a novel approach to achieving robustness to input variations encountered in the real world by generating adversarial instances that compose disentangled representations. We have shown how this framework can be realized by leveraging the StyleGAN architectureresulting in models that are not only robust to systematic evaluation of insensitivity to variations but also exhibit better generalization, demonstrating that that accuracy is not necessarily at odds with robustness. Our formulation relies on good generative models that can learn a disentangled representation from which some directions are orthogonal to the label we are trying to predict. Methods such as AdvMix are intended to be used to reduce the effect of bias and spurious correlations on classifiers. 10 We hope the promising results shown in this paper encourage the development of more effective disentangled representations that cover most factors of variations encountered in the real world. Finally, we hope this work leads to the exploration of this paradigm in the context of other Computer Vision applications and leads to the development of robust perception systems that can be safely used in the real world.
Achieving Robustness in the Wild via Adversarial Mixing with Disentangled Representations (Supplementary Material)
A. Additional examples Figure 9 shows additional examples of perturbations obtained on Colored-MNIST by (a) mixup, (b) adversarial attacks on ∞ -bounded perturbations of size = 0.1, and (c) our method AdvMix. Figure 10 shows examples on CELEBA. The underlying classifier is the nominally trained convolutional network. We observe that the perturbations generated by AdvMix are semantically meaningful and result in plausible image variants -to the contrary of the other two methods. Figure 11 shows image variants generated by AdvMix. For four out of five images, AdvMix is able to change the decision of a "smile" detector (nominally trained on CELEBA). We can qualitatively observe that brighter skin-tone and rosy cheeks tends to produce images that are more easily classified as "smiling". Our interpretation is that pictures on the second row appear to be taken using flash photography (where it is more common for people to smile). The second picture from the left (on the second row) also seem to be taken at night during an event. Figure 11 . Example of perturbations obtained by AdvMix on randomly generated images. The top row consists of images generated by a StyleGAN model -all these images are classified as "not smiling" by the nominal classifier (the numbers indicate the classifier output probability for "smiling"). The second row consists of adversarial perturbations obtained by AdvMix. The last row shows the rescaled differences between the original images and their variant.
B. mixup results on CELEBA
For completeness, Table 4 shows the performance of mixup on the CELEBA attributes used in Table 3 . We observe that mixup sometimes improves over nominal training, but is otherwise consistently worse than AdvMix. 
